This paper estimates a New Keynesian model with positive trend in ‡ation and compares the empirical …t of the model featuring a Taylor rule with …xed versus time-varying in ‡ation target while allowing for indeterminacy. The estimation is conducted over two di¤erent periods covering the Great In ‡ation and the Great Moderation. The rule embedding time variation in in ‡ation target turns out to be empirically superior and determinacy prevails in both sample periods. This …nding, therefore, rules out self-ful…lling in ‡ation expectations as an explanation of the high in ‡ation episode in the 1970s. Counterfactual simulations …nd that the decline in in ‡ation-gap volatility and predictability is driven by better monetary policy. In contrast, the reduction in output growth variability is mainly explained by reduced volatility of technology shocks.
Introduction
Post-World War II U.S. economy is generally characterized by two particular eras:
the Great In ‡ation and the Great Moderation. There is strong evidence that the former era is represented by highly volatile in ‡ation and output growth while there has been a marked decline in macroeconomic volatility in the latter period (Blanchard and Simon, 2001; McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000; and Stock and Watson, 2002) . The Great Moderation is also associated with changes in the predictability of in ‡ation. For instance, Stock and Watson (2007) document that in ‡ation has become absolutely easier, but relatively harder to forecast, in the Volcker-Greenspan era. They argue that forecasting in ‡ation has become absolutely easier because of its reduced volatility while predicting in ‡ation has become relatively harder due to its reduced persistence. What are the reasons behind this shift from the Great In ‡ation to the Great Moderation era?
One prominent explanation, put forth by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and further advocated by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) , suggests that the shift is attributable to changes in the behavior of the Federal Reserve. This literature argues that U.S. monetary policy in the 1970s failed to respond su¢ ciently strongly to in ‡ation thereby generating indeterminacy.
1 Consequently, self-ful…lling in ‡ation expectations is regarded as the driver of the high in ‡ation episode in the 1970s. According to this view, a switch from a passive to an active response to in ‡ation brought about a stable and determinate environment since the early 1980s. 2 In a conceptually related study, Boivin and Giannoni (2006) …nd that this switch has also been instrumental in reducing observed output and in ‡ation volatility. Moreover, Benati and Surico (2008) show that by responding more strongly to in ‡ation, monetary policy has contributed to the decline in persistence and predictability of in ‡ation relative to a trend component.
While these studies only consider a constant zero in ‡ation target (i.e. a zero in ‡a-tion steady state), a di¤erent picture emerges from studies allowing for positive trend in ‡ation. For instance, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) argue that a stronger response to in ‡ation is not enough 1 Roughly speaking, indeterminacy refers to the multiplicity of rational expectations equilibria while an equilibrium that is locally isolated and uniquely determined by preferences and technologies is called determinate. See Farmer (1999) for a formal de…nition.
2 A policy response to in ‡ation is called active if it satis…es the Taylor Principle -an aspect of the Taylor rule that describes how, for each one percent increase in in ‡ation, the central bank should raise the nominal interest rate by more than one percentage point to ensure determinacy. Otherwise, it is labelled as passive.
to explain the shift to determinacy after the Great In ‡ation. Instead, they document that a decline in trend in ‡ation as well as a change in the policy response to the output gap and output growth have played a crucial role. Nonetheless, there is a large literature disputing the view of a …xed in ‡ation target. Amongst them Tinsley (2005, 2009 ), Ireland (2007) , Stock and Watson (2007) , Cogley and Sbordone (2008) and Castelnuovo, Greco and Raggi (2014) …nd evidence in favor of time-varying in ‡ation target. Furthermore, Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) argue that the decline in the variability of the Federal Reserve's in ‡ation target is the single most important factor behind the reduction in in ‡ation volatility and persistence.
Empirical investigations conducted so far have either looked at the plausibility of a switch from indeterminacy to determinacy through the lens of a model featuring …xed (either zero or positive) target or allowed for time-varying in ‡ation target while restricting the model to determinacy alone. 3 Unfortunately, the assumption of a In doing so, it makes two contributions. First, the paper shows that the rule embedding time variation in in ‡ation target turns out to be empirically superior and determinacy prevails not only in the Great Moderation era but also in the pre-Volcker period. Therefore, unlike the literature's preponderant view, this …nding rules out self-ful…lling in ‡ation expectations, i.e. sunspots, as an explana-3 One exception is Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) who use a limited information singleequation approach to estimate a Taylor rule with time-varying coe¢ cients which allow them to extract a measure of trend in ‡ation and construct a time-series for the probability of determinacy for the U.S. economy. However, (in-)determinacy is a property of a rational expectations system that requires a full information estimation approach. Moreover, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) estimate a constant term of the Taylor rule which contains trend in ‡ation but also the equilibrium real interest rate and the Fed's targets for real GDP growth and the output gap. Consequently, the level of trend in ‡ation is not separately indenti…ed and hence they need to make additional assumptions.
tion of the Great In ‡ation. Second, it shows that both good policy and good luck are jointly required to explain the Great Moderation. 4 Counterfactual exercises suggest that better monetary policy, both in terms of a stronger response to the in ‡ation gap and smaller ‡uctuations of the in ‡ation target process, has dampened most of the ‡uctuations in the in ‡ation gap and contributed to the decline in its predictability.
In contrast, changes in monetary policy alone fail to explain the reduced variability of output growth which is explained by a reduction in the volatility of technology shocks.
In contrast to the existing literature, the current paper distinguishes between trend in ‡ation and time-varying in ‡ation target. Trend in ‡ation, a term coined by Ascari (2004) , stands for a strictly positive level of steady state in ‡ation around which to approximate …rms'…rst-order conditions in the derivation of the New Keynesian
Phillips curve (henceforth NKPC). Allowing for positive trend in ‡ation is crucial as it a¤ects the determinacy properties of the model. Ascari and Ropele (2007, 2009) show that trend in ‡ation makes price-setting …rms more forward-looking which ‡attens the NKPC and widens the indeterminacy region. On the other hand, following Sargent for the Federal Reserve's long-run target compatible with its long-run goals such as in ‡ation stability and sustainable economic growth. A …xed in ‡ation target is simply equal to trend in ‡ation in the model. In contrast, time-varying in ‡ation target follows a persistent exogenous autoregressive process as in Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) , but one whose unconditional mean is equal to positive trend in ‡ation.
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The main …ndings can be summarized as follows. First, when considering the model with constant positive in ‡ation target, indeterminacy can neither be ruled in nor ruled out before 1979 while determinacy prevails after 1984. This stands in contrast to Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) who estimate a similar model allowing for positive constant trend in ‡ation and …nd that the U.S. economy was explicitly in the indeterminacy region of the parameter space before 1979 and switched to determinacy afterwards. While these authors employ a model with …rm-speci…c labour following Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) , the current paper uses a model with homogenous labor in the benchmark speci…cation following Ascari and Ropele (2009) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014) . Indeed, when using …rm-speci…c labor, this paper …nds that the pre-Volcker period is unambiguously characterized by indeterminacy as well. Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) show that the model with …rm-speci…c labor is more susceptible to indeterminacy induced by higher trend in ‡ation than the model with homogeneous labor which explains the di¤erence.
Yet, the upshot completely di¤ers when allowing for time-varying in ‡ation target.
This time the posterior density favors determinacy for both the pre-1979 and post-1984 sub-samples. This result suggests that monetary policy, even during the preVolcker period, was su¢ ciently active to ensure determinacy. Using posterior odds ratio to compare the two speci…cations under the assumption of homogenous labor, the paper then reports evidence in favor of time variation in the in ‡ation target process for both the Great In ‡ation and the Great Moderation period. Furthermore, when assuming …rm-speci…c labor, the paper …nds the …t of …xed versus time-varying in ‡ation target to be comparable for both sample periods.
Perhaps most closely related to this paper are studies by Castelnuovo (2010) , Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) , Castelnuovo, Greco and Raggi (2014) , and
Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) . Both Castelnuovo (2010) and Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) estimate a New Keynesian model log-linearized around a zero in ‡ation steady state and perform counterfactual simulations to assess the drivers of the Great Moderation. The current paper departs along the following dimensions.
First, it estimates a model log-linearized around a positive steady state in ‡ation. Ascari and Ropele (2009) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014) document that positive trend in ‡ation substantially alters the NKPC relationship and therefore it changes the in ‡ation dynamics and determinacy regions. Moreover, Ascari, Castelnuovo and Rossi (2011) and Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) show that a model with positive steady state in ‡ation …ts better than its simple New Keynesian counterpart which is log-linearized around zero in ‡ation steady state. Second, it compares the …t of …xed versus time-varying target while also allowing for indeterminacy. Finally, it employs the Sequential Monte Carlo (henceforth SMC) algorithm developed by Schorfheide (2014, 2015) while both Castelnuovo (2010) and Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) employ Random-Walk Metropolis Hastings (henceforth RWMH) algorithm. Schorfheide (2014, 2015) demonstrate that the SMC algorithm is better suited for multi-modal and irregular posterior distributions. In contrast, the current paper estimates a similar model with homogenous labor and allows for time variation in the in ‡ation target process. The paper documents that time-varying in ‡ation target empirically …ts better (or at least no worse in the case of …rm-speci…c labor) than a …xed target and determinacy prevails in both sample periods. Moreover, it conducts counterfactual exercises to uncover the driving forces of the Great Moderation. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the …rst one to test for indeterminacy using a full-information structural approach while allowing 6 See also Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) who are the …rst ones to apply Bayesian estimation using the SMC algorithm to test for indeterminacy using Schorfheide's (2003, 2004) methodology.
7 Arias, Ascari, Branzoli and Castelnuovo (2017) corroborate these …ndings as well as those in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) 9 Unlike Ascari and Sbordone (2014) , the paper assumes stochastic growth modelled as the technology level following a unit root process, replaces their labor supply disturbance by a discount factor shock as a stand-in for demand shocks and introduces external habit formation in consumption to generate output persistence. In light of the result of Cogley and Sbordone (2008) regarding the lack of empirical support for intrinsic inertia in the GNK Phillips curve, the model is estimated in the absence of rule-of-thumb price-setting. Finally, the Taylor rule involves responses to the output gap and output growth instead of logdeviations of output from the steady state. These assumptions then make the model similar to the one estimated by Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) . One important distinction is that the current paper allows for time variation in the Federal 8 An exception is Orphanides (2004) who …nds an active response to expected in ‡ation in a Taylortype rule estimated for the pre-1979 period, thereby claiming that self-ful…lling expectations cannot be a source of macroeconomic instability during the Great In ‡ation. However, Ascari and Ropele (2007, 2009) show that an active response to in ‡ation does not guarante equilibrium determinacy when allowing for positive trend in ‡ation. Moreover, Orphanides' (2004) …nding is based on a single-equation framework. Instead, the current paper recognizes indeterminacy as the property of a system and hence uses full-information structural estimation. 9 The plain-vanilla New Keynesian model features a poor internal propagation mechanism. As a result the posterior mass might be biased toward the indeterminacy region. See the discussion between Beyer and Farmer (2007) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) . However, trend in ‡ation generates more endogenous persistence of in ‡ation and output even under determinacy thus making the indeterminacy test less susceptible to bias.
Reserve's in ‡ation target.
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The log-linearized model
The log-linearized equilibrium conditions are given by the following equations 11
where
Lower case letters denote logdeviations from steady state. Here y t and y n t stand for de-trended output and natural level of output respectively, x t is the output gap, r t denotes the nominal interest rate, t symbolizes in ‡ation, t represents the Federal Reserve's time-varying in ‡ation target, t is an endogenous auxiliary variable, s t denotes the resource cost due to relative price dispersion and E t represents the expectations operator. Eq. (1) is the dynamic IS relation re ‡ecting an Euler equation where h 2 [0; 1] represents the 10 Moreoever, following Ascari and Sbordone (2014) , the paper assumes homogenous labor whereas Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) assume …rm-speci…c labor.
11 A full description of the model is delegated to the Appendix to conserve space.
degree of habit persistence and g stands for the steady state gross rate of technological progress which is also equal to the steady state gross rate of balanced growth. Eq. (2) and (3) represent the GNK Phillips curve where 2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, 2 [0; 1) is the fraction of …rms whose prices remain unchanged from previous period, is the steady state gross in ‡ation rate or trend in ‡ation, " > 1 is the price elasticity of demand, and ' is the inverse elasticity of labour supply. Eq. (2) boils down to a standard NKPC when trend in ‡ation is zero (i.e. = 1) and this assumption also implies that t = 0. Eq. (4) is a recursive log-linearized expression for the price dispersion measure under Calvo pricing mechanism. Eq. (5) represents monetary policy, i.e. a Taylor-type rule in which ; x ; y; r are chosen by the central bank and echo its responsiveness to the in ‡ation gap, output gap, output growth and the degree of inertia in interest rate setting respectively. The term r;t is an exogenous transitory monetary policy shock whose standard deviation is given by r . Eq. (6) is the de…nition of the output gap while the law of motion for the natural level of output is given by Eq. (7).
The remaining fundamental disturbances involve a preference shock d t , a nonstationary technology shock g t , and an in ‡ation target shock t . Each of these three shocks follow AR(1) processes:
and
where the standard deviations of the innovations d;t , g;t and ;t are denoted by d , g and respectively.
Under a …xed in ‡ation target, the paper assumes that the policy rules becomes
where the central bank's target is equal to steady-state in ‡ation or trend in ‡ation .
Rational expectations solutions under indeterminacy
To solve the model, the paper applies the method proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) . The linear rational expectations (henceforth LRE) system can be compactly written as
where % t , " t and t denote the vector of endogenous variables, fundamental shocks and one-step ahead expectation errors respectively and 0 ( ), 1 ( ), ( ) and ( ) are appropriately de…ned coe¢ cient matrices. From a methodological perspective, the solution algorithm of Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) follows from that of Sims (2002). However, it has the added advantage of being general and explicit in dealing with expectation errors since it makes the solution suitable for solving and estimating models which feature multiple equilibria. In particular, under indeterminacy, t becomes a linear function of the fundamental shocks and purely extrinsic sunspot disturbances, t . Hence, the full set of solutions to the LRE model entails
where ( ), " ( ; f M ) and ( ) 12 are the coe¢ cient matrices. 13 The sunspot shock
2 ). Accordingly, indeterminacy can manifest itself in one of two di¤erent ways: (i) purely extrinsic non-fundamental disturbances can a¤ect the model dynamics through endogenous expectation errors; and (ii) the propagation of fundamental shocks cannot be uniquely pinned down and the multiplicity of equilibria a¤ecting this propagation mechanism is captured by the arbitrary matrix f M .
Following the methodology proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) , f M is replaced with M ( ) + M and the prior mean for M is set equal to zero. The particular solution employed selects M ( ) by using a least squares criterion to minimize the distance between the impact response of the endogenous variables to fundamental shocks, @% t =@" 0 t , at the boundary between the determinacy and the indeterminacy region.
14 Analytical solution for the boundary in this model is unavailable and hence, following Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) and Hirose (2014) , this paper resorts to a numerical procedure to …nd the boundary by perturbing the parameter in the monetary policy rule.
12 Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) express this term as ( ; M ), where M is an arbitrary matrix. For identi…cation purpose, the paper imposes their normalization such that M = I.
13 Under determinacy, the solution boils down to
14 This methodology has been used in previous studies, such as Benati and Surico (2009) , Doko Tchatoka, Groshenny, Haque and Weder (2017) and Hirose (2007 Hirose ( , 2008 Hirose ( , 2013 Hirose ( , 2014 .
Econometric strategy 3.1 Bayesian estimation with Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) algorithm
The paper uses Bayesian techniques for estimating the parameters of the model and tests for indeterminacy using posterior model probabilities. It employs the SMC algorithm proposed by Schorfheide (2014, 2015) which is particularly suitable for irregular and non-elliptical posterior distributions. Another practical advantage of using an importance sampling algorithm like SMC is that the process does not require one to …nd the mode of the posterior distribution, a task that can prove to be di¢ cult particularly under indeterminacy.
First priors are described by a density function of the form
where S 2 fD; Ig, D and I stand for determinacy and indeterminacy respectively, S represents the parameters of the model S and p(:) stands for the probability density function. Next, the likelihood function, p(X T j S ; S), describes the density of the observed data where X T are the observations through to period T . Following Bayes theorem, the posterior density is constructed as a combination of the prior density and the likelihood function:
where p(X T jS) is the marginal data density conditional on the model which is given
Following Schorfheide (2014, 2015) , the paper builds a particle approximation of the posterior distribution through tempering the likelihood. A sequence of tempered posteriors is de…ned as
where n is the tempering schedule that slowly increases from zero to one.
The algorithm generates weighted draws from the sequence of posteriors f n ( S )g N n=1 , where N is the number of stages. At any stage, the posterior distribution is represented by a swarm of particles
, where W i n is the weight associated with i n and N denotes the number of particles. The algorithm has three main steps. First, in the correction step, the particles are re-weighted to re ‡ect the density in iteration n. Next, in the selection step, any particle degeneracy is eliminated by resampling the particles. Finally, in the mutation step, the particles are propagated forward using a Markov transition kernel to adapt to the current bridge density.
In the …rst stage, i.e. when n = 1, 1 is zero. Hence, the prior density serves as an e¢ cient proposal density for 1 ( S ). That is, the algorithm is initialized by drawing the initial particles from the prior. Likewise, the density of n ( S ) is a good proposal density for n+1 ( S ).
Number of particles, Number of stages, Tempering schedule The tempering schedule is a sequence that slowly increases from zero to one and is determined by
where controls the shape of the schedule. The tuning parameters N; N and are …xed ex ante. The estimation uses N = 10; 000 particles and N = 200 stages. The parameter that controls the tempering schedule, , is set at 2 following Herbst and Schorfheide (2015) .
Resampling Resampling is necessary to avoid particle degeneracy. A rule-of-thumb measure of this degeneracy, proposed by Schorfheide (2014, 2015) , is given by the reciprocal of the uncentered variance of the particles and is called the e¤ective sample size (ESS). Following them, the estimation employs systematic resampling
Mutation Finally, one step of a single-block RWMH algorithm is used to propagate the particles forward.
Data
The paper employs three U.S. quarterly time series: per capita real GDP growth rate, 
where g = 100(g 1), = 100( 1) and r = 100(r 1).
Calibrated parameters
The discount factor is set to 0.99, the steady-state markup to ten percent (i.e. " = 11), and the inverse of the labor-supply elasticity to one. Following Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) , the autoregressive parameter of the in ‡ation target shock is …xed at = 0:995. Alternatively, one may follow Ireland (2007) by assuming that the in ‡ation target shock follows a unit-root process. Instead, the paper follows Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent's (2010) calibration as they show that a unit-root in ‡ation target process may counterfactually imply low in ‡ation-gap predictability.
The remaining parameters are estimated. Table 1 For the shocks, the prior distributions for all but one follow an inverse-gamma distribution with mean 0:60 and standard deviation 0:20. The exception is the standard deviation of the innovation to the in ‡ation target shock which is an important parameter in the analysis. Following Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) , the paper adopts a weakly informative uniform prior on (0; 0:15) for this parameter.
Prior distribution
Finally, in line with Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) , the coe¢ cients M follow standard normal distributions. Hence, the prior is centered around the baseline solution of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) . The choice of the priors leads to a prior predictive probability of determinacy of 0:498, which is quite even and suggests no prior bias toward either determinacy or indeterminacy. Table 2 collects the results for the empirical performance of the model with …xed versus time-varying in ‡ation target. To assess the quality of the model's …t to the data, the paper uses log marginal data densities and posterior model probabilities for both parametric regions. The SMC algorithm-based approximation of the marginal data density is given by
Model comparison
where e w i n is the incremental weight de…ned by
In case of …xed in ‡ation target, the evidence for (in-)determinacy for the preVolcker period is mixed while determinacy prevails after 1984. Phrased alternatively, the possibility of indeterminacy cannot be ruled out in the …rst sub-sample. Indeed, when assuming …rm-speci…c labor instead of homogenous labor as in Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) , the pre-Volcker period is unambiguously characterized by indeterminacy (as shown in a later section).
However, when allowing for time variation in the in ‡ation target pursued by the In terms of posterior odds ratio, the marginal likelihood points toward the empirical superiority of the speci…cation featuring time variation in the in ‡ation target.
The Bayes factor involving …xed versus time-varying target reads about 20 for both the pre-Volcker and post-1984 sample periods. According to Kass and Raftery (1995) , a Bayes factor between 1 and 3 is "not worth more than a bare mention", between 3
and 20 suggests a "positive" evidence in favor of one of the two models, between 20
and 150 suggests a "strong" evidence against it, and larger than 150 "very strong"
evidence. Hence, this result points toward a "positive"evidence in favor of the model where the Federal Reserve follows a time-varying in ‡ation target. Moreover, like Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) , the innovation variance of the two shocks, ;t and r;t , declined quite notably. According to the posterior mean estimates, the innovation variance fell from 0:07 to 0:04 for the in ‡ation target shock, and from 0:42 to 0:21 for the policy-rate shock. However, unlike Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) who …nd a moderate increase in the responsiveness to the in ‡ation gap, this paper …nds quite a substantial increase across the two periods. This …nding suggests that both the systematic response to the in ‡ation gap and better anchoring of the in ‡ation target might have played a key role in the decline in in ‡ation-gap volatility and predictability.
Parameter estimates
Among the other parameters, habit remained unchanged while the degree of price stickiness increased slightly. As noted by Smets and Wouters (2007) , the increase in price stickiness is consistent with the hypothesis that low and stable in ‡ation may reduce the cost of not adjusting prices and therefore lengthen the average price duration. In fact, Kurozumi (2016) shows that when the degree of price stickiness is endogenously determined in the Calvo model, the probability of price adjustment rises with trend in ‡ation and this mitigates the e¤ect of higher trend in ‡ation on the likelihood of indeterminacy. However, following Ascari and Ropele (2007, 2009 ), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014) , the paper assumes that price stickiness is exogenously determined.
Among the non-policy shocks, there is an increase in the persistence and volatility of the discount factor shock, a …nding shared with Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) . However, there is a decline in the volatility of technology shocks, which is in line with Smets and Wouters (2007) and Leduc and Sill (2007) . Moreover, while being relevant for the unconditional FEVDs of mean-based in ‡ation gap (given its high persistence), the role of such a calibration is less obvious for the FEVDs of target-based gap even at lower frequencies. As regards the policy-rate shock and the preference shock, the contribution is considerable in explaining the ‡uctuations in the in ‡ation gap and policy rate at shorter horizons. For instance, the preference shock is most important in driving movements in the nominal interest rate at higher frequencies.
Finally, it is also interesting to compare the di¤erences in the relevance of the shocks across sub-samples. As mentioned above, technology shock is the key driver of ‡uctuations in output growth in both sample periods. While in the Great In ‡a-tion era, in ‡ation target shocks play a dominant role in explaining the ‡uctuations of target-based in ‡ation gap and the policy rate, however, when moving to the Great Moderation sub-sample there are notable di¤erences. The variance decompositions reveal that both preference and policy-rate shocks are important in explaining movements in target-based in ‡ation gap even at longer horizons. Moreover, for policy-rate ‡uctuations, preference shocks play a key role at all horizons.
Overall, the variance decomposition exercise suggests that the decline in the innovation variance of in ‡ation target shocks might have played a signi…cant role with regard to the decline in in ‡ation-gap volatility while technology shocks might have been more important for the decline in output growth volatility. 5 What explains the switch from indeterminacy to determinacy in the pre-Volcker period?
The …nding that allowing for time-varying in ‡ation target leads to determinacy for both sample periods might be surprising given that the literature has established the pre-Volcker period as characterized by indeterminacy. Yet, this …nding relies on in ‡ation dynamics which has been shown by Stock and Watson (2007) Consider a classical monetary model characterized by the Fisher relation
and a simple Taylor rule
where r t , t and t denote the nominal interest rate, in ‡ation rate and real interest rate respectively and E t denotes the mathematical expectations operator. Following Bianchi and Nicolò (2017) , the real interest rate follows a mean-zero Gaussian i.i.d.
process. The rational expectations forecast error t is de…ned such that
The system is expressed as
If > 1, a unique non-explosive solution exists and is of the form which implies that t follows an i.i.d. process and the last equality is obtained by recalling the assumption on t .
In contrast, if 1, the solution to (13) is obtained by combining (13) with (12) and it takes the form
where the stability requirement imposes no restriction on the one-step ahead forecast error t .
For the present purpose, note that t in equation (16) exhibits richer dynamics than that in equation (15). As a result, the endogenous persistence implied by equation (16) suggests that indeterminacy cannot be ruled out under the assumption of a …xed in ‡ation target.
On the other hand, this is not the case when allowing for time-varying in ‡ation 
Federal Reserve' s in ‡ation target
Before moving on to study the drivers of the Great Moderation, this section assesses the model-implied evolution of the Federal Reserve's in ‡ation target. Here, the paper employs the Kalman smoother to obtain ex-post estimates of t based on the observations that are included in the construction of the likelihood function. As such, this serves as an external validity check. (2010), Aruoba and Schorfheide (2011), and Castelnuovo, Greco and Raggi (2014) .
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Each panel plots GDP de ‡ator in ‡ation rate as well.
Several notable …ndings arise. First of all, there is a striking di¤erence between the estimated target and that of Kozicki and Tinsley (2005) . These authors estimate a VAR model allowing for shifts in the in ‡ation target and imperfect policy credibility, de…ned by di¤erences between the perceived and the actual in ‡ation target. The disparity may be due to their imperfect credibility and learning mechanism whereby the private sector cannot perfectly distinguish between permanent target shocks and transitory policy shocks. points to the essence of trend in ‡ation. While Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) leave the …rst moment of observed in ‡ation unmodelled, the current paper overcomes this shortcoming by explicitly modelling in ‡ation's long-run value (by log-linearizing around a positive steady state) on top of its dynamics.
The implicit in ‡ation target is also close to that of Ireland (2007) 18 , Aruoba and Schorfheide (2011) and Castelnuovo, Greco and Raggi (2014) , particularly for the pre-Volcker period for which the correlation reads 0:99, 0:99 and 0:97 respectively.
However, the estimated target turns out to be much smoother and somewhat di¤erent than theirs in the second sub-sample. In particular, since the early 2000s, there is a clear divergence. During this period, the estimate turns out to be higher than the alternative measures as well as actual in ‡ation itself. This …nding is intuitive and captures the fear of de ‡ation among policymakers at that time which led to extra easy monetary policy and lowering of the Federal Funds rate. 19 As noted by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) , keeping interest rates low for an extended period of time is equivalent to a rise in the time-varying in ‡ation target.
The estimated target is also similar to Leigh (2008) who uses a time-varying parameter Taylor rule and the Kalman …lter focusing on the post-1980 sample period alone. 20 As in Leigh (2008 Leigh ( , p. 2022 , the time-varying implicit in ‡ation target for the post-1984 sub-sample can be divided into separate chunks: (i) 'the opportunistic approach to disin ‡ation' -a period covering from mid-1980s to mid-1990s -during which according to Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) the Fed did not take deliberate anti-in ‡ation action but rather waited for external circumstances to deliver the desired reduction in in ‡ation; (ii) 'the low-in ‡ation equilibrium'in the late 1990s; and (iii)
'the de ‡ation scare'in the early 2000s during which the in ‡ation target rose above actual in ‡ation.
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Finally, as a note of caution, one must be careful in drawing these comparisons.
The di¤erences could be due to di¤erences in investigated samples, data transformation, structure imposed on the data and vintage of the data.
What explains the Great Moderation in the U.S.?
What are the reasons behind the decline in macroeconomic volatility and in ‡ation gap predictability? To answer this question, the paper conducts counterfactual exercises following Castelnuovo (2010) and Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) . The objective here is to disentangle the role played by good policy and good luck. In comparison to these studies, the exercises are still meaningful as the current paper estimates a model log-linearized around a positive steady state in ‡ation rate. Ascari and Ropele (2007, 2009 ) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014) show that this modelling assumption substantially alters the NKPC relationship and hence it changes the in‡ation dynamics. This assumption also facilitates analysis using both mean-based and target-based in ‡ation gap.
19 See Bernanke (2002 Bernanke ( , 2010 and Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) . 20 Leigh (2008) focuses on estimating the implicit target based on both core PCE in ‡ation and GDP/GNP implicit de ‡ator in ‡ation. The third panel in Figure 2 plots the one labelled as "Estimate of GDP/GNP de ‡ator target (real-time forecasts)"(see Figure 5 , page 2028 in the published paper). 21 For alternative interpretation of monetary policy during the 2000s, see Groshenny (2013) , Belongia and Ireland (2016) and Doko Tchatoka, Groshenny, Haque and Weder (2017). This paper also focuses on the persistence of the in ‡ation gap using the R 2 j statistic proposed by Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) . 23 To measure persistence at a given date t, these authors propose to calculate the fraction of the total variation 22 The data used in estimation implies a fall of the standard deviation of output growth of about 48% and that of in ‡ation of about 57%.
23 Using this measure of persistence based on short-and medium-term predictability within a simple New Keynesian model, Benati and Surico (2008) show that a more aggressive poliy stance towards in ‡ation causes a decline in in ‡ation predictability. However, they estimate the model for the Great Moderation period only, thus stopping short of using the methodology of Schorfheide (2003, 2004) to allow for indeterminacy and estimate the model during the Great In ‡ation period as well.
in the in ‡ation gap that is due to shocks inherited from the past relative to those that will occur in the future. They suggest that this is equivalent to one minus the fraction of the total variation due to future shocks. Since future shocks account for the forecast error, they express this as one minus the ratio of the conditional variance to the unconditional variance where j denotes the forecast horizon. Table 6 reports R 2 j statistic for in ‡ation-gap predictability for forecast horizons of one, four and eight quarters. Similar to the …ndings reported in Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) , there is a marked decline in the persistence of time-varying targetbased gap at all three horizons. However, it is remarkably muted for mean-based in ‡ation gap. This result shows that the persistence of these two series is considerably di¤erent, a …nding in line with the autocorrelation of the two series based on pre and post-Volcker data reported in Ascari and Sbordone (2014) . Moreover, it is also in line with Benati (2008) who fails to detect a change in raw in ‡ation persistence in the U.S. around the time of the Volcker stabilization. Importantly, both mean-based in ‡ation gap and raw in ‡ation remained persistent as in ‡ation target continued to drift after the Volcker disin ‡ation. Instead, it is time-varying target-based in ‡ation gap that has become less persistent. Hence, the results shed further light on the …ndings of Cogley and Sargent (2002) , Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) on the one hand and Benati (2008) on the other.
Counterfactuals
Next the paper conducts counterfactual exercises designed to disentangle the role played by good policy and good luck in explaining the Great Moderation where it closely follows the counterfactual scenarios studied in Castelnuovo (2010) and Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) . Following these authors, the paper divides the experiment into two broad categories. First, it combines the parameters pertaining to the This exercise is designed to capture the role of better monetary policy in reducing the volatility of the in ‡ation gap (both mean-based and target-based) and output growth and the persistence of target-based in ‡ation gap series. In the second category, it combines private sector parameters of the second sub-sample with the policy parameters of the …rst. This scenario, labelled 'Policy 1, Private 2', is designed to study the contribution of non-policy factors. Leduc and Sill (2007) and Castelnuovo (2010) . As in Leduc and Sill (2007) , the decline in output growth variability is mainly explained by the reduction in the volatility of technology shocks. Hence, both good policy and good luck are jointly required to explain the reduction in output growth and in ‡ation-gap volatility.
Digging further, the paper …nds that both stronger response to the in ‡ation gap ( ) and better anchored in ‡ation objective, i.e. a reduction in the volatility of in ‡ation target shocks ( ), are key ingredients in the reduction of in ‡ation-gap variability. This outcome stands in contrast to Castelnuovo (2010) and Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) who both …nd that a stronger response to the in ‡ation gap during the Great Moderation period only plays a minor role. Interestingly, the decline in the Federal Reserve's long-run in ‡ation target ( ) plays a negligible role. That a reduction in is negligible for the reduced variability of target-based in ‡ation gap is a-priori expected as cancels out when looking at log-deviations of the in ‡ation gap, t t . However, that it is quantitatively unimportant for the variability of mean-based in ‡ation gap as well is much less obvious given the qualitative result in Ascari and Sbordone (2014) that trend in ‡ation a¤ects the volatility of macroeconomic variables. As regards the decline in in ‡ation-gap persistence, the paper focuses on timevarying target-based in ‡ation gap alone as the decline in the persistence of meanbased gap is rather muted. Table 8 reports the results. The main message from these experiments goes hand in hand with the counterfactuals related to volatility reduction.
In particular, better monetary policy, mainly in terms of a stronger response to the in ‡ation gap and a reduced variability of in ‡ation target shocks, is the key driver of the decline in in ‡ation-gap predictability. Moreover, the decline in the Federal
Reserve's long-run in ‡ation target, i.e. , plays a quantitatively negligible role.
Further investigation
The robustness checks involve (i) testing for indeterminacy using a GNK model with …rm-speci…c labor; and (ii) estimating the model over the entire region of the parameter space, i.e. over both determinacy and indeterminacy.
Firm-speci…c labor
In contrasting …xed versus time-varying in ‡ation target, the analysis so far has relied on a GNK model with homogenous labor following Ascari and Ropele (2009) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014) . The paper …nds that a model with time-varying in ‡ation target empirically …ts better than one featuring …xed in ‡ation target and determinacy prevails in both the pre-Volcker as well as the post-1984 sample periods. However, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) show that a similar model with …rm-speci…c labor is more susceptible to indeterminacy induced by higher trend in ‡ation than a model with homogenous labor. Hence, the paper conducts further investigation along this dimension and estimates the model of Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) who employ …rm-speci…c labor. In order to establish a valid comparison, it uses the exact same set of priors, observables and sample periods as they do. 24 However, to achieve identi…cation between the in ‡ation target process and the policy-rate shock, this paper assumes that the latter follows a transitory i.i.d. process while the former is a highly persistent AR(1) process as before. Table 9 Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017) is the same as in the current paper, i.e. 1966:I -1979:II, while for the second sub-sample they use a slightly di¤erent period ranging from 1982:IV -2008:IV. The choice of the second sub-sample is innocuous for the …ndings. 25 The appendix reports parameter estimates.
Estimation over the entire parameter space
A di¢ culty in the methodology of Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) is that the likelihood function of the model is possibly discontinuous at the boundary between the determinacy and indeterminacy region. In order to bridge the gap between the likelihood function and improve the test for indeterminacy, Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) there is still a possibility that it might have prevailed under a …xed target. Moreover, time-varying target …ts better in both periods. The parameter estimates are also similar to the ones from the respectively favored models when estimated separately under determinacy and indeterminacy. Finally, the paper also estimates the model with …rm-speci…c labor over the entire region. Once again, the results remain robust and are delegated to the appendix. 26 For an alternative approach that allows estimation over the entire parameter space while using standard packages and estimation algorithms see Bianchi and Nicolò (2017) . D jX T g 0:67 1:00 1:00 1:00 log p(X T ) represents the SMC-based approximation of the log marginal data density and P f S 2 D jX T g denotes the posterior probability of determinacy of equilibrium.
Conclusion
This paper estimates a Generalized New Keynesian model with positive trend in ‡a-tion. While allowing for indeterminacy, it assesses the empirical …t of …xed versus time-varying in ‡ation target for the Great In ‡ation and the Great Moderation period. Several notable …ndings arise. First, when considering the model with …xed in ‡ation target, the paper …nds that indeterminacy cannot be ruled out in the preVolcker period while there is a switch to determinacy after the Volcker-disin ‡ation.
However, determinacy unambiguously prevails in both sample periods when the mon- The decline in in ‡ation-gap volatility and predictability is driven by better monetary policy, both in terms of a more active response to the in ‡ation gap and a more anchored in ‡ation target. In contrast, the reduction in output growth variability is mainly explained by reduced volatility of technology shocks.
The paper choose to make these arguments by assuming that trend in ‡ation is positive but constant while the Federal Reserve pursues a time-varying in ‡ation target.
This choice helps to keep the analysis simple yet related to existing research. However, one could depart instead by log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions around 
